INTRODUCTION
Many techniques exploit dependency of the power consumption or electromagnetic emanation on data processing operations performed within a cryptographic hardware. For example, attacks like differential power analysis (DPA) [1] , correlation power analysis (CPA) [2] , differential electromagnetic emanation analysis (DEMA) [3] , or correlation electromagnetic emanation analysis (CEMA) [4] are common, and not so difficult to perform, side channel attacks (SCA). All these attacks require an appropriate description of the data-dependent power consumption or electromagnetic emanation using information leakage models, such as Hamming weight (HW) or Hamming distance (HD) power models. Construction of the HW power model (HWPM) is less complex than the construction of the HD power model (HDPM), but also less efficient. Power models are usually made considering the architecture of the cryptographic algorithm, or rather register transfer level (RTL) description of the algorithm that is implemented in the attacked device. More about poweranalysis attacks can be found, eg in [5] .
Side-channel-leakage arises during processing sensitive intermediate values by data-dependent operations causing data-dependent power consumption or another physical behavior. We can further distinguish between data, and operation dependences, respectively. Examples of these operations are data registering, multiplexing and addressing, but also data transferring, and any combinational logic operations on data (eg AND, OR, XOR). Note that any high level function can be decomposed to these basic operations. The side-channel-leakage depends on the technical realization of these basic elements. For example, registers created in programmable logic blocks in FPGA cause higher side-channel-leakage than registers in embedded memories because the programmable logic blocks are more complex due to their programmability features while registers in embedded memory are hardwired, optimized and small.
Other SCAs
The Correlation or Differential family of attacks is a very generic method to attack when only limited information is known about the implementation, and only limited access is possible to the device. They are dangerous and can reveal the secret in many cases, but there are more powerful attacks called Template or Profiling attacks [6] . Such attacks use more sophisticated description of the sensitive leakage [7] , like stochastic methods [8] , multivariate Gaussian distribution [9] , multivariate regression, and conditional entropy (mutual information analysis MIA [10] ). These attacks, however, need to have access to the same device (or another instance of the device) before the attacks are performed, in other to make the statistical profile of the leakage (the templates). There are also some works using evolution and genetic algorithms [11] . Very powerful attacks are also active side-channel-attacks, namely Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) [12, 13] , and hardware trojan horses [14] .
Related work & our contribution
Work [15] deals with CPA against integer multiplication with constant secret operand. In that work, attack against ECDSA implementation in passive RFID is performed. The ECDSA implementation is based on 163-bit elliptic curve, and the sensitive multiplication is performed using a 16-bit integer multiplier. They demonstrate revealing of the first 2 16-bit blocks of the one chosen secret constant operand k (private key). The sensitive integer multiplication is the multiplication kr , where r is known and k is the private key. This sensitive multiplication is performed in DSA and its variations, such as in ECDSA. The pair (s, r) creates the digital signature of the message m. The n is a per-message random nonce.
In this work, we randomly and uniformly generate 665 16-bit keys and try to reveal them. We used measured as well as simulated power traces using HDPM. Based on these results, we estimated success rate and complexity of the attack against 16-bit blocks of k , and we demonstrate the improvement on this results.
Finally, possible efficient countermeasure is discussed, and the work is concluded.
PRELIMINARIES
We can expect more than one key hypothesis remaining after the simulated correlation analysis. It is because multiplication by a constant is a linear function, and furthermore we use HDPM, while for example, if attacking AES S-Box, there is only one key hypothesis (only one correlation peak) because it is nonlinear function at all. In this work, we show how it is possible to repress the impact of the linearity to achieve better success rate considering complexity.
The measurement and attack setup used is depicted in Fig. 1 . A 16-bit integer multiplier is implemented in FPGA. The FPGA has further implemented only the necessary functionality for our experiments. Goal of this work is to demonstrate the improvement for guessing a constant operand of a 16-bit multiplier from generic point of view. This constant operand (noted as key or k ) has been multiplied by known ordered set of second operands. In order to distinguish between possible hypotheses about the value of the constant operand, correlation coefficient is used. There are not special analyses or preprocessing techniques, nor special side-channel-leakage models, used. There is only the classical correlation power analysis employed. Our goal is not to adjust the analysis of the multiplier implementation to gain the best success rate, and make it appropriate for the one implementation instance, but rather see such generic attack possibilities. The CPA uses HDPM of the multiplication result
where h m,k ′ is a hypothesis to the m-th multiplication result as a consequence of the hypothesis k ′ to the real k . The P m,k ′ is then hypothesis to the power consumption of registering (m + 1)-th multiplication result.
The CPA analysis aim is to exploit power consumption caused by registers that register results of multiplications. It is generally accepted that the power consumption of registers is linearly dependent on number of 1 → 0 and 0 → 1 transitions. Thus, the power consumption can be simulated by HD which is better fitting than the HW. However, measured power consumption will be noised by other functionality of the FPGA, which runs parallel, and also by the environment. Consider now Signal to noise ratio. In our case of analysis, signal consists of dynamic power consumption caused by the 32-bit registers for multiplication results. The noise signal consists of dynamic power consumption caused by LFSR (used to generate the known ordered set of second operands), state machine (used to control dataflow), UART (for communication), and signal added by environment and measurement.
The FPGA (Altera Cyclone III) and measurement points (Fig. 2) circuitry have their own chamber in the shield. All: linear regulators and filters, configuration circuitry, input/output circuitry, and the main Murata filter have separate chambers as well. Described improvements enhance signal to-noise ratio of the leakage, or in other words will reduce the number of traces needed for a successful CPA attack. We want to get as clean leakage signal as possible in order to assess the strength of particular Fig. 3 . Demonstration of the improvement on results of guessing 665 randomly and uniformly generated 16-bit keys: After 1 st CPA using trcs -"1-TRCS", using sims -"1-SIMS", after 2 nd CPA using trcs -"2-TRCS" and using sims -"2-SIMS" countermeasures. We are curious, if simple (but efficient) EMI shielding, or the usage of another measurement point causes otherwise secure CPA countermeasure to be inadequate. Up to now, we have found that the selection of measurement points matters. The voltage drop on a series measurement resistor is definitely not the best choice. We found out that the voltage on the decoupling capacitor ( Fig. 2(c) ) gives us the best results. Therefore power traces were measured using this measurement point, and they were averaged by 128 traces.
The oscilloscope used has 8-bit AD converter, and 20G samples per second rate of signal sampling. The FPGA used has frequency 131,072MHZ. We recorded the power traces exactly in the clock when results of multiplication are registered. We considered only key hypotheses with negative correlations.
THE IMPROVEMENT
CPA is used to order key hypotheses from the most fitting one to the worst fitting one. The hypotheses are ordered based on the correlation coefficient in that way that the lower one is the most fitting, and the closed to 0 one is the worst fitting, and we throw all the hypotheses with positive correlation coefficient. Afterwards the hypotheses are ordered, the correct key hypothesis is between the first D of them with some probability. Guessing of 665 randomly and uniformly generated 16-bit keys can be seen in the Fig. 3 . From this figure, we can see that if we take 10 first key hypotheses (D = 9 ) after the 1 st CPA, the attack will succeed in 100 % for measured power traces. For simulated power traces, we must take D = 11 . The 1 st CPA uses HDPM of all 32-bit registers for multiplication result (2) .
In order to improve the attack, we took the first 10 key hypotheses ordered according to the correlation coefficient after the 1 st CPA in both cases, and performed 2 nd CPA attack in order to reorder the first 10 key hypotheses. In the 2 nd CPA attack, we made HDPM only to the vector of the 16 least significant bits of the possible result of multiplication
The new order of the 10 first key hypotheses brings improvement as can be seen in Fig. 3 . In this figure, counts for CPA using measured as well as simulated power traces are depicted. The success rate for simulated CPA is negligible different of the real CPA after the 2 nd CPA. The improvement in the case of the simulated CPA is crucial in estimation of success rate and complexity for guessing of N 16-bit blocks of key.
Estimations of success rate and complexity for guessing of N 16-bit blocks of key based on measured power traces can be found in Fig. 4 . In this graph the improvement is demonstrated on difference in success rate and complexity after 1 st and 2 nd CPA respectively. The estimations are bounded for maximal complexity 2 60 as this is a boundary of our computation power, and for minimal probability of success which must by greater than 0.5 as there must be probability of success more than 50 %. These are boundaries for our demonstration of our improvement in this work.
When we look at the guessing of N 16-bit blocks after the second CPA attack (Fig. 4) , we can see the brought 
POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST THIS CPA
This CPA needs to have the secret operand constant and to know some second operands of the multiplication. One possible countermeasure to thwart this attack, which does not need special countermeasures, such as hiding (dummy cycles, noise generator, dual-rail-logic [16] ) or masking (boolean, multiplicative [17] ), is to use the nonce n (the per message randomly and uniformly generated number) to mask the key as
Before the private key is multiplied by known r , it is multiplied by the inversion of an unknown nonce. In order to make this attacks impossible, (1) must be replaced by (4).
The cost of this countermeasure is one more multiplication by the inversion of the nonce. This countermeasure is effective since the nonce is random and not public, thus it is not know to the adversary, and this countermeasure is efficient because it costs only one more multiplication and not other special logic, such as in case of an additional masking and hiding.
If there would be the countermeasure made in the way that the key instead of r would be multiplied by the n −1 , the countermeasure would not be effective enough, because a next leakage would be produced. Power consumption of multiplication n −1 Hash(m) and multiplication n −1 k must correlate for processing blocks of Hash(m) having values equal to values of the corresponding blocks of k .
CONCLUSION
We improved the CPA attack and we eliminated the error of the simulated CPA attack. The improvement is in performing the second CPA but only on the first 10 key hypotheses ordered according to the correlation coefficient from the first CPA. As the power model for the second CPA, we used again generic HDPM, however, this time, only for the first half of the least significant bits instead of all the bits of the multiplication result. This brought improvement since after the second CPA, it is possible to guess more blocks of the key with approximated probability 0.613 and complexity 2 59.45 . Also for the other choices of D , there is an improvement in success rate or complexity. For more details, consult Tab. I and the graph depicted in Fig. 4 . After the second CPA, simulated attacks achieve negligible difference in success rate and complexity in comparison with attacks using measured power traces. It is very important for approximation of attack success rate and complexity based on simulated attacks.
Finally, we discussed possible effective and efficient countermeasure. In order to thwart this correlation power attack by the discussed countermeasure no further masking or hiding must be employed in case of DSA and ECDSA.
